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THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
H. BRADLEY JONES*
D URING the last war, posters appeared on the bulletin boards of
many plants wryly pronouncing the principle that "a bumblebee
can't fly." Aerodynamic laws of lift, thrust, and drag clearly so demon-
strated. The defiant bee in flight across the poster was of course in-
tended to stimulate inquiry among the chairborne engineers and de-
signers of democracy's arsenal. An ordinary airplane having the same
relative weight and wingspan of a bee could not fly with the conventional
power then available. Today's wingless missiles go the bee one better.
The laws of physics remain the same. The difference lies in their prac-
tical and useful application by inventive and open-minded men.
Statutes, cases, and canons of ethics uniformly state that "a corpora-
tion cannot practice law." Less uniformly, similar principles today apply
to the professions of medicine, accountancy, and architecture. Wherever
applied, this doctrine operates to deprive the practitioner of many op-
portunities for tax shelter, business continuity, and business planning
which are otherwise available under existing tax laws only when busi-
ness is done in the corporate form. Nevertheless, the doctrine is entirely
correct when it operates so to limit practice of a profession by the ordi-
nary business corporation with the conventional powers and attributes
now available under existing state law. Such a corporation should not
be permitted to practice a profession.'
What lawyer in private practice would welcome such corporate com-
petition? Many lawyers are all too conscious of the modern erosion of
the scope of the practice of law by lay competitors who are so frequent-
ly unencumbered by training commensurate with theirs and also seem
occasionally to be unfettered by anything equivalent to their standards
of ethics. Struggles with banks, accountants, title companies, escrow
companies, and collection agencies over unlawful practice of law have
long required the devoted common effort of the organized bar. The list
of such antagonists of the profession seems to grow year by year. Trust
companies and insurance companies with their armies of solicitors, es-
tate planners, pension and profit sharing planners, management and la-
bor relations consulting firms, and a host of other corporate mercenaries
* Member of the California Bar.
1. See articles on this problem by Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law,
5 Fordham L. Rev. 207 (1936); Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law: A Study in
Legal Hocus-Pocus, 2 Md. L. Rev. 342 (1938); Comment, Corporations-Doing Profes-
sional Services Through Others, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (1947).
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appear to encircle the embattled private practitioner of law like a mythi-
cal crop of dragon's teeth.
Fidelity to the concept that a layman must not be permitted, directly
or indirectly, to practice a licensed learned profession is basic to this in-
quiry. By examining the reasons for the prohibitions against practice of
the professions by business corporations can we devise a statutory cor-
porate entity which has none of the professional dangers or defects of the
conventional business corporation, and which consequently would afford
many professional practitioners the tax and business advantages which
their commercial brethren enjoy? What are the desired advantages and
how successful have efforts been to gain some measure of tax equality
during recent years through alternative legislative proposals? Are any
of these alternatives as favorable to the professional man as the privilege
of practicing his profession under the tax shelter of a professional cor-
poration?
THE PROHIBITIONS AND THEIR PRESENT EXTENT
Many reasons for the prohibition against the practice of certain
professions by business corporations operated for profit have been ad-
vanced or discussed by the courts and professional committees on ethics.
Other objections can be inferred from applicable statutes. The chief rea-
sons can be summarized as follows:
1. A corporation is not eligible for a license to practice the profession;
hence, such practice is not a "lawful purpose" for which a cor-
poration may be formed.
2. The relation of the practitioner of a profession and his client or
patient is purely personal; statutory prerequisites to the right to
practice are high and form a basis for trust and confidence. A cor-
poration cannot have these personal qualifications and would not
be deserving of the same personal trust.
3. If a corporation employs a practitioner, his first duty is to his em-
ployer rather than to the client or patient. He would be subject
to the directions of his employer rather than to those of his client
or patient.
4. A "middleman" should not, as a matter of public policy, be per-
mitted to intervene for profit in establishing the professional rela-
tionship between the practitioner and members of the public.
5. Priority of contract would be with the corporation, not the prac-
titioner.
6. Even if all officers and directors are licensed, transfer of their
shares by sale, operation of law, or succession would result in un-
licensed laymen profiting from the practice of a profession through
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share ownership in such a corporation. Marketable shares descend-
ible under the laws of inheritance are objectionable.
7. The corporation could not be disbarred or suspended.
8. Unscrupulous practitioners might find shelter from liability in cor-
porations in cases of malpractice claims, particularly in the medi-
cal professions.
Corporate Practice of Law
In respect to corporate practice of law, perhaps one of the best judicial
statements of reasons for the doctrine is found in the New York case,
Matter of Co-operative Law Co.,2 which held that a statute permitting
three or more persons to form a corporation "for any lawful business"
purpose does not permit the formation of a corporation to practice law.
The court stated:
The practice of law is not a business open to all, but a personal right, lim-
ited to a few persons of good moral character, with special qualifications ascer-
tained and certified after a long course of study, both general and professional, and
a thorough examination by a state board appointed for the purpose. The right
to practice law is in the nature of a franchise from the state conferred only for
merit. It cannot be assigned or inherited but must be earned by hard study and
good conduct. It is attested by a certificate of the Supreme Court and is protected
by registration. No one can practice law unless he has taken an oath of office and
has become an officer of the court, subject to its discipline, liable to punishment
for contempt in violating his duties as such, and to suspension or removal. It is
not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all
the conditions required by statute and the rules of the courts. As -these conditions
cannot be performed by a corporation, it follows that the practice of law is not a
lawful business for a corporation to engage in. As it cannot practice law directly,
it cannot indirectly by employing competent lawyers to practice for it, as that
would be an evasion which the law will not tolerate ....
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a limited and
dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and confidence. It cannot be dele-
gated without consent, and it cannot exist between an attorney employed by a
corporation to practice law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would be
subject to the directions of the corporation, and not to the directions of the client.
There would be neither contract nor privity between him and the client, and he
would not owe even the duty of counsel to the actual litigant. The corporation would
control the litigation, the money earned would belong to the corporation, and the
attorney would be responsible to the corporation only. His master would not be the
client but the corporation, conducted it may be wholly by laymen, organized simply
to make money and not to aid in the administration of justice which is the highest
function of an attorney and counselor at law. The corporation might not have a
lawyer among its stockholders, directors or officers. Its members might be without
character, learning or standing. There would be no remedy by attachment or dis-
barment -to protect the public from imposition or fraud, no stimulus to good conduct
from the traditions of an ancient and honorable profession, and no guide except
2. 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
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the sordid purpose to earn money for stockholders. The bar, which is an institution
of the highest usefulness and standing, would be degraded if even its humblest mem-
ber became subject to the orders of a money-making corporation engaged not in
conducting litigation for itself, but in the business of conducting litigation for others.
The degradation of the bar is an injury to the state.
A corporation can neither practice law nor hire lawyers to carry on the business
of practicing law for it any more than it can practice medicine or dentistry by hiring
doctors or dentists to act for it. . . .The legislature in authorizing the formation of
corporations to carry on "any lawful business" did not intend to include the work of
the learned professions. Such an innovation with the evil result that might follow
would require the use of specific language clearly indicating the intention.3
Prohibition of corporate practice of law has since been reaffirmed by
decisions to similar effect and with similar reasoning.4 At least one court
has proleptically questioned the constitutionality of any legislation which
might permit corporate law practice.'
Moreover, the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association
speak plainly on the issues of control being interposed between lawyer
and client' and the sharing of income with laymen (stockholders).' In
1950, a group of lawyers sought to avail themselves of the then apparent
tax advantages of practice through the form of a Massachusetts (busi-
ness) trust. One of the lawyers sought the opinion of the Committee
3. Id. at 483-84, 92 N.E. at 16.
4. Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); People v. California Pro-
tective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926); People v. Merchants' Protective
Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); People ex rel. ll. State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931); State v. Merchants' Protec-
tive Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
5. In the Matter of Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
6. Intermediaries:
"The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any
lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A law-
yer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which
direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A law-
yer's relations to his client should be personal and the responsibility should be direct to
the client. Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed such inter-
mediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association, club
or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the organization,
as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not include the rendering of legal
services to the members of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs."
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, Canon 35 (1949).
7. Division of Fees:
"No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon
a division of service or responsibility. But sharing commissions between forwarder and
receiver, at a commonly accepted rate, upon collections of liquidated commercial claims,
though one be a lawyer and the other not, is not condemned hereby, where it is not pro-
hibited by statute." Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association,
Canon 34 (1949).
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on Professional Ethics. The committee turned the idea aside, chiefly
on those grounds.'
Corporate Practice of Medicine
The general rule remains that corporations operated for profit may
not practice medicine, even through employees who are duly licensed
physicians and surgeons.9 The same rules seem to apply to all of the
healing arts, such as dentistry,' ° chiropody (podiatry)," and ophthal-
mology., 2
The growth of health plans, tax pressures, and the expediencies of
hospitals have produced a number of exceptions to the rule. For exam-
ple, patients may incorporate to purchase low cost medical services, if
the corporation is not formed for profit.'3 Statutes authorizing Blue
Cross and Blue Shield medical plans are. almost universal. A sanitarium
corporation providing medical care, even though operated for profit, can
collect for professional services rendered by its employees under Texas
law.' 4 In Missouri, although a corporation operated for profit may not
practice medicine, it may do so indirectly through licensed physician-
employees.'5 The emerging social need for adequate medical services
at a cost within the means of the great mass of voters has undeniable
attraction for state legislators. In medicine, the line of demarcation is
becoming increasingly blurred. Nonprofit corporations practice medicine
almost everywhere and the patients' bills are more frequently paid by
insurance or health plan corporations or welfare funds than by them-
selves.
Although the courts and legislatures have evidenced their willingness
to relax this stricture, advisers on ethics within the medical profession
have not entirely capitulated. Many clinics have recently quite under-
standably sought to avail themselves of the tax benefits of a Kintner'6
8. Opinion of Professional Ethics Committee, No. 283, 36 A.B.A.J. 870 (1950).
9. People v. United Medical Serv. Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936); Annot.,
103 A.L.R. 1240 (1936).
10. Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 196 N.E. 799 (1935). But see
Lewis v. Woodbury Dental Parlors Co., 106 Misc. 78, 175 N.Y. Supp. 269 (Sup. Ct. 1919);
State ex rel. Bloom v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 96 Ore. 529, 188 Pac. 960 (1920).
11. Pilger v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co., 86 Cal. App. 277, 261 Pac. 328 (1927).
12. Drucker v. Medical Examiners, 143 Cal. App. 2d 702, 300 P.2d 197 (1956); see
Annot., 102 A.L.R. 343 (1936); Annot., 128 A.L.R. 585 (1940).
13. California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946).
14. Republic Reciprocal Ins. Ass'n v. Colgin Hosp. & Clinic, 123 Tex. 31, 65 S.W.2d
286 (1933).
15. State ex inf. Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907); see also
State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).
16. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). This decision is discussed
at pp. 364-65 infra.
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form of association taxable as a corporation. At least one medical asso-
ciation has cautioned its members against embarking upon such a venture
because of "the inherent inconsistency of a medical group of physicians
seeking corporate status for tax purposes but denying corporate status
for all other purposes (such as medical ethics and the requirements of
the Medical Practice Act)."'17 The California "requirements" refer to
section 2008 of its Business and Professions Code which provides, in
part, that "corporations and other artificial legal entities have no pro-
2218fessional rights, privileges or powers....
The ethical inhibitions upon doctors are steadily changing. Compare
the former American Medical Association statement on this matter
which reads: "A physician should not dispose of his professional attain-
ments or services to any hospital, lay body or organization, group or
individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under terms
or conditions which permit exploitation of the services of the physician
for the financial profit of the agency concerned," 9 with the present
provision which says merely that: "A physician should not dispose of
his services under terms or conditions which tend to interfere with or
impair the free and complete exercise of his medical judgment and skill
or tend to cause a deterioration of the quality of medical care."2 Sig-
nificantly, the suggestion of the addition of the phrase "or permit the
sale of his professional services by any lay person or corporation" was
rejected by the doctors.2
Nevertheless, group medical practice by clinics is clearly on the in-
17. Field, Medical Groups-Pension Plans, 88 Los Angeles County Medical Bull. No. 9,
at 31 (May 1, 1958).
18. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2008. See note 6 supra.
19. Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Ass'n ch. VII, § 3 (1951).
20. Principles of Medical Ethics § 6 (adopted in 1957), 164 A.M.A.J. No. 13, at 1484
(1957).
21. In 1957 the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association reaffirmed
the "Guides for Conduct for Physicians in Relationships with Institutions" which had
been adopted in 1951. The Guides suggested certain general principles, including: "1. A
physician should not dispose of his professional attainments or services to any hospital,
corporation or lay body by whatever name called or however organized under terms
or conditions which permit the sale of the services of that physician by such agency for a
fee." 164 A.M.A.J. 1118-20. Also in 1957, the House of Delegates endorsed the following
statement of a reference committee: "Your reference committee is impressed by the neces-
sity of informing all physicians and the general public as to the evils which may be inherent
in the socialization of medicine through corporate activity as well as by government
action .... In many of its forms it is indistinguishable in practice and effect from sociali-
zation of medicine and appears to embody all its evils. . . . Your reference committee
therefore recommends that the problem be referred to the Board of Trustees with the
request that it devise and initiate a campaign to educate both physicians and the general
public as to the dangers inherent in the illegal corporate practice of medicine in its various
forms."
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crease throughout the country. Where state law inhibits the conduct
of a clinic in corporate form, a separate profit corporation is not infre-
quently formed to conduct some of its business aspects.2 Moreover, at
least one commentator has contended that the practice of medicine is
in fact a lawful corporate purpose.23
Corporate Practice of Accounting
Although the accounting profession flatly forbids, as a matter of pro-
fessional ethics,24 practice of any member in the corporate form, cor-
porate practice of accountancy is specifically permitted by the laws of
California,25 Georgia, 26 Illinois,27 Iowa,28 Michigan,29 Missouri, 0 North
Carolina,31 Texas, 32 and Wisconsin.33  However, even in California a
22. Group Medical Practice and Clinics-Some Organizational Problems, 4 Stan. L.
Rev. 401, 411-13 (1952).
23. Note, Right of Corporation to Practice Medicine, 48 Yale L.J. 346, 348 (1938),
where the author says, in part:
"Courts which profess to deny all corporations the right to have any connection with
medical activities have apparently misconstrued the purpose of the state licensing statutes.
These statutes are designed to preserve the public health by excluding from practice persons
with inadequate ability, morality, and training. Since the diagnosis and treatment of
disease are obviously purely personal functions, a corporation can perform them only
through the medium of doctors. But the mere fact that a corporation employs physicians,
or is operated by physicians, provides no valid basis for requiring the corporation itself
to be licensed. As long as the doctors are properly licensed and their professional activities
are not interfered with by unlicensed persons, the purpose of the statutes is fully effected,
for no one without proper qualifications is then directly or indirectly administering to
the public. This is true even though laymen may be entrusted with considerable control
over administrative details. Only when lay officers or directors exercise substantial super-
vision over the professional activities of the physicians employed is there ground for
arguing that the corporation is enabling unlicensed persons to practice medicine. Thus the
real issue is not whether corporations generally are unlicensed to practice medicine, but
whether in each individual case physicians are actually controlled in their purely profes-
sional functions by unlicensed persons in such a manner as to nullify the purpose of the
licensing statutes."
24. This prohibition is found in Rule 11 of Rules of Professional Conduct, American
Institute of Accountants, as revised Dec. 19; 1950, 1 C.P.A. Handbook, ch. 5, p. 6, which
provides: "A member shall not be an officer, director, stockholder, representative or agent
of any corporation engaged in the practice of public accounting in any state or territory
of the United States or the District of Columbia."
25. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5062.
26. Ga. Code Ann. § 84-215 (1935).
27. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110Y2, § 39 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
28. Iowa Code § 116.6 (1954).
29. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.13 (1957).
30. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 326.020 (1949).
31. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 93-6 (1950).
32. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 41a § 10 (1948).
33. Wis. Stat. § 135.07 (1955).
1958]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
corporation cannot qualify as a certified public accountant3 4 and the
tendency there seems to be toward making restrictions on corporate
practice of accountancy more, rather than less, exacting.35
Corporate Practice of Architecture
Corporate practice of architecture is prohibited in Colorado,36 Penn-
sylvania," and New York (unless the corporation was formed prior to
1929),"8 but seems to be lawful in Arkansas,39 Georgia,40 Illinois, 41 and
Texas.42 Florida will not license an architectural corporation, but per-
mits a licensed shareholder to recover for services performed in its
name.43 In California, a corporation may not obtain a certificate, but it
can contract to provide the services of certificated architects or collect
for its services as a non-certificated person, if it has disclosed its lack
of a certificate." Nevertheless, the American Institute of Architects
announces this approach to the matter: "Corporations may not practice
and in the case of a firm, all the members must be licensed if their
names are to appear.'45
PROPOSAL FOR A FORM OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
Having isolated the reasons for and defined the scope of this limitation
on business organization of these professions, it should not be an in-
superable task to describe and to legislate into existence an acceptable
form of "professional corporation." Such a corporation should be subject
to the supervision and regulation of the state administrative agencies
and official state boards regulating both corporations in general and
the profession which the particular corporation is formed to practice.
Such a professional corporation should have, as a matter of state statu-
tory law, the following limitations and special characteristics:
1. All of its officers, directors, and shareholders shall be persons
licensed to practice the profession by the state of domicile.
34. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5091; Accounting Corp. v. State Bd. of Accountancy,
34 Cal. 2d 186, 208 P.2d 984 (1949).
35. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5062.
36. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-2-10(2) (1955).
37. Pa. Stat. tit. 63, § 31 (1936).
38. N.Y. Educ. Law § 7307(2).
39. Ark. Stat. § 71-302(3) (1947).
40. Folsom v. Summer, Locatell & Co., 90 Ga. App. 696, 83 S.E.2d 855 (1954).
41. I1. Rev. Stat. c. 103/2, § 3 (1955).
42. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1302(45) (1948).
43. Robert L. Weed, Architect, Inc. v. Horning, 159 Fla. 847, 33 So. 2d 648 (1947).
44. Binford v. Boyd, 178 Cal. 458, 174 Pac. 56 (1918).
45. Handbook of Architectural Practice pt. 1, ch. 1, at 13 (1953).
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2. No professional corporation shall be permitted to practice more
than one licensed profession.
3. Shares may be held only by such licensees who are natural persons
and no professional corporation may hold stock in another pro-
fessional corporation, merge or consolidate with a foreign profes-
sional corporation, or permit any lay person at any time to own
any of its shares.
4. Shares shall not be transferable without the consent of the state
agency licensing the profession, except in retirement or redemption
thereof by the corporation or among the existing shareholders of
the corporation. Shares may be issued only with the consent of
the state licensing agency.
5. The professional corporation shall afford no limitation on the
liability of its officers, directors or shareholders for any errors,
omissions, malpractice or other torts committed by its agents,
employees, officers, directors, or shareholders in the scope of their
employment by or professional activities on behalf of the cor-
poration.
6. No layman shall have any part in the ownership, management,
or control of the corporation. No proxy may be given to any per-
son to vote any shares of the corporation other than a person
licensed by the law of the state of corporate domicile to practice
the profession of the corporation.
7. Upon the death or retirement of a stockholder, the corporation
must purchase, redeem, or retire all of the shares of such stock-
holder out of capital as well as surplus without restriction, unless
the shares are promptly purchased by the remaining shareholders
of the corporation or other licensed practitioners (with the consent
of the state licensing agency). This redemption may require exe-
cution by the remaining shareholders of a bond or undertaking
to be delivered to the state agency governing the practice of the
profession, indemnifying creditors of the corporation, and shall
be lawful even though such purchase or redemption temporarily
renders the corporation insolvent.
8. The corporation's license to practice the profession shall be subject
to revocation in any of the following events:
a) upon the revocation of the professional license of any officer,
director, or shareholder not promptly retired by the corpora-
tion;
b) should any judgment for malpractice against the corporation
remain unsatisfied;
c) upon the final order, after appropriate hearing, of the state
1958]
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agency governing the profession, upon petition of such agency
or any shareholder of the corporation having a grievance on
the grounds of a violation of the standards or rules of ethics
of the licensed profession against the corporation, its officers
or directors; of any client or patient of the corporation; or of
the Attorney General of the state;
d) upon the death or surrender of the license of the last remaining
shareholder of the corporation.
Such a "professional corporation" should, it is submitted, satisfy all
of the objections previously described. No creeping corporate monster
could cross state lines, as many professional partnerships (e.g., national
accounting firms) now do. No layman could share its profits, intervene
between the professional man and his patient or client, or deprive the
relationship of its essential trust and confidence. No practitioner could
avoid responsibility or liability for his malpractice, errors, or omissions.
The corporation can be disbarred, suspended, or lose its professional
license for the misconduct of its owners, agents or employees in the same
manner as an individual practitioner. A legal entity, it is no more an
"intermediary" than a professional partnership or association requiring
duties among partners or associates as well as duties toward the patient
or client. All of its members must have the character, learning, and
standing required of its profession. No bank, lay association, commer-
cial or nonprofit corporation may own or control the professional cor-
poration.
Doubtless many professional men will recognize how closely the pro-
fessional corporation reflects the practical aspects of their day-to-day
operations. Others, with becoming and native conservatism, will ap-
proach this concept with extreme caution. Some may flatly refuse to
re-examine the issues involved and prefer to continue to operate with
maximum personal exposure to state and federal taxation.
Admittedly, the foregoing suggestions cry out for refinement and closer
study, require precise consideration and hard work by legislative drafts-
men and lobbyists for the affected professions in the several states, and
demand full and open critical discussion wherever the second-class pro-
fessional taxpayers congregate. These imperatives are based upon the
fact that no other proposal for our specific tax relief has had any success
in Congress to date.
OTHER PROPOSALS FOR TAX RELIEF
The need for tax relief for the professions has long been generally
recognized .4  Early proposals advocating application of corporate fed-
46. Wolder, The Forgotten Men of Taxes, 24 Taxes 970 (1946).
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eral income tax rates to enterprises which could not incorporate under
state law, after an allowance for "reasonable, construptive salaries" to
the principals" met with serious objections4" and vanished in legislative
limbo. Even when the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was passed con-
taining the ill-fated privilege of certain partnerships to elect to be taxed
as corporations 4 9 professional partnerships were specifically excluded"
from the privilege.
Legislative treatment of proposals to put private professional prac-
titioners on an equal footing with corporate employees in respect to pen-
sion, profit sharing, or retirement trust participation has been equally
unsuccessful in Congress. At first, it was hoped that existing provisions
of the income tax laws could be extended to include partners and sole
proprietors, 1 inadequate as it appeared to some.52 The debate was an
exhaustive one, rightly concerning itself with attempts to predict the
"Treasury's attitude on loss of revenue," what kind of securities could
be used to fund such plans and other niceties dear to the hearts of so
many lawyers, particularly'in published debate. The struggle is spread
upon the Reports of the Committee on Federal Income Taxes of the
Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association from 1947 through
1950. Result: no single specific proposal foi legislation. Congress, how-
ever, was innocent of any blame in the matter, since the law profession
was itself unable to agree.
During the years 1950 through 1955, the concepts of "averaging"
income over a period of time to equalize taxes on fluctuating incomes had
their day in the sun. These plans were varied and complex.5 3 A tax
imposed upon annual net income at the graduated individual rates was,
by now, with cited dramatic examples of prize fighters with big purses
and short careers, the target. By 1953, the American Bar Association
Committee had determined to give legislative support to the Bravman
plan, after debating several others. Yet no such provision appears today
in the Internal Revenue Code or in the income tax laws of any state.
One proposal has met with less internecine distress. Popularly called
47. Hearings on Proposed Revisions of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House
Ways and Means Committee, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1717-22 (1947).
48. Silverson, Earned Income and the Ability to Pay, 3 Tax. L. Rev. 299 (1948).
49. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1361. This privilege of election was revoked by § 63
of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958.
50. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1361(b)(4).
51. Nicholson, Pensions for Partners: Tax Laws Are Unfair to Lawyers and Firms,
33 A.B.AJ. 302 (1947).
52. Rudick, More About Pensions for Partners, 33 A.B.A.J. 1001 (1947).
53. Bravman, Equalization of Tax on All Individuals with the Same Aggregate Income
Over the Same Number of Years, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
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the "Jenkins-Keogh Bill," it was originally introduced in 1951." 4 Re-
introduced in both the 83rd and 84th Congresses, it reached its previous
highwater mark when it was approved by the House Ways and Means
Committee on July 19, 1955. It has the support of the organized bar.55
Passed by the House on July 29, 1958, a modified form of HR9 and
HR10 was permitted to die in the Senate amid a chorus of assurances
of reintroduction at the next session. The proposal is, simply stated, to
permit self-employed individuals and groups to contribute to and par-
ticipate in pension plans subject to restrictions and with benefits com-
parable to the features of a qualified plan under section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, from which professionals are now ex-
cluded. The literature on the proposal is too extensive and its purport
too well known to be here repeated." Its performance in Congress,
where it is tactfully opposed by the Treasury,57 does not distinguish it
from any of its predecessors above summarized or now pending," despite
all of the deserved support it continues to receive from the professions.
KINTNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
In the midst of unremitting legislative disappointments, the Ninth
Circuit gave considerable comfort to many when it permitted an un-
incorporated association of doctors in Missoula, Montana, to pay their
taxes as a corporation and enjoy the benefits of a qualified pension plan
over the strenuous objections of the Treasury Department based chiefly
on the fact that a corporation cannot practice medicine under Montana
54. H.R. 4371, H.R. 4373, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), then popularly called "Reed-
Keogh."
55. Approvals by the House of Delegates and by local bar associations are summarized
in 1 A.B.A. News, No. 1, at 2 (July 16, 1956). Moreover, the ABA Committee on
Pensions and Other Deferred Compensation has strongly endorsed it in principle. Similar
action has been taken by the American Medical Association and local medical associations
and the American Institute of Accountants.
56. Note, Favorable Tax Treatment for Individual Pension Plans: The Jenkins-Keogh
Bill, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1953); Keogh, Social Security Legislation and the Jenkins-
Keogh Bill, 28 N.Y.B. Bull. 273 (1956); Trigg, Jenkins-Keogh Bills-What They Mean
to the Lawyer, 24 The Detroit Law. 3 (1958).
57. Congressman Keogh has been quoted as reporting that: "The Treasury Department
has gone on record as approving the principle of this legislation, but as opposing one of
its consequences-namely, the revenue loss that would be sustained by the Federal Treas-
ury." (See 28 N.Y.B. Bull. 273, 277.) Treasury estimates of revenue loss have ranged
from $660,000,000 in 1956 to $400,000,000 in the 1958 Hearings. Proponents say it will
cost only about $100,000,000 in taxes during its early years. 3 A.B.A. News No. 2, at 2
(February 15, 1958).
58. The Sparkman Bill, S. 3194, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), providing for 10% of
earned income or $1,000 per year to be deductible each year if set aside for retirement is
illustrative.
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law. 9 Those lawyers who cautiously awaited Treasury reaction to the
decision, for months exercising uneasy restraint on their clients, were
rewarded for their prudence when the Treasury not only failed to ac-
quiesce but announced its determined opposition to the plan.60 There
the matter seemed to rest, except among some adventurers who chose to
gamble (particularly in the shelter of the Ninth Circuit), until the
Treasury tantalizingly issued Revenue Ruling 57-546 on October 10,
1957, "modifying" its prior position, but concluding with the gift of the
following package (with its oddly disturbing ticking sound): "Basic
criteria to be used in testing the existence of an association taxable as a
corporation will be stated in a Revenue Ruling to be published at a later
date."'" No such ruling has been forthcoming to date. Consequently,
most lawyers have immersed the package in a water bucket for the time
being, as much out of respect for the intended professional recipient's
prior record of tax misfortunes as out of native distrust of the sender.
Less cautious (or more openly desperate) practitioners have formed
Kintner associations, some of them avowedly declaring that they have
little to lose by giving it a whirl. How-to-do-it articles on the subject
appeared while the ink had barely dried on the opinion.2 The Kintner
Articles of Association have been widely published. Nevertheless, after
prodding the Treasury a little," most continue to await the descent of
the tablets describing the "criteria" but suspect that the criteria will
probably include "thou shalt nots" limiting the use of Kintner associa-
59. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
60. Rev. Ru]. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 598, which declared, in part: "A group of
doctors who adopt the [business] form of an association in order to obtain the benefits
of corporate status for purposes of section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
is in substance a partnership for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. It follows
that the doctor-members are employers and therefore not employees. Rev. Rul. 33, Part
2(a) (1), C.B. 1953-1, 267 at 269. Furthermore, any period of service as members of a
prior partnership will not be credited as a period of employment for purposes of the
above section. The contrary position expressed in the case of United States v. Arthur R.
Kintner et ex., 216 Fed. (2d) 418, will not be accepted by the Internal Revenue Service as a
precedent in the disposition of other cases involving similar fact situations."
61. 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 886.
62. E.g., Dolman, New Tax and Retirement Benefits for Group Professional Practice,
30 Los Angeles B. Bull. 259 (1955), where fifteen attributes and advantages are suggested
in a tempting list.
63. Casey, Tax Tested Compensation Forms, § 21,208, Institute of Business Planning
(1958) sets them forth in full with marginal comments, but without recommendation for
specific applications.
64. Mackay, Pension Plans and Associations Taxable as Corporations for Professional
Persons, 10 Sw.L.J. 281 (1956) reports that in a letter dated March 7, 1956 the Rulings
Division had informed him that the Treasury intended Rev. Rul. 56-23 to apply to the
rest of the professions, as well as doctors, unless they could in fact incorporate under
state law.
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tions to relatively large groups with more than nominal capital assets
and investments, thereby affording individuals or small firms no tax
relief whatever.
As in the case of Jenkins-Keogh, most professional men wish Kintner
well. The fact remains that the federal legislative and administrative
processes have not, however, smiled upon the professional practitioner
to date. Even the apparent federal blessings of the new pseudo-corpora-
tion tax treatment now apparently available to small business corpora-
tions6" will not be available to him unless steps are taken to permit
practitioners of the professions to incorporate as a matter of new state
law. Therefore, should not the profession consider its chances with the
state legislatures? If Montana's law had permitted professional corpora-
tions, would the Treasury have forced Dr. Kintner and his associates
to go to court even if they had not in fact incorporated?
The proposal for professional corporations does not conflict with the
Kintner design. It tends to confirm it, broaden the area of coverage,
and avoid the dark and bloody ground of consistent congressional de-
feats.
TAXES ON PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
In whatever form accepted by the state legislatures, the professional
corporation will ordinarily derive all or most of its income from personal
services. Will this constitute "personal holding company income" within
the meaning of section 543 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954? If
so, our professional corporation must, like Kintner associations, be size-
able since it is anticipated that in many cases 25 per cent or more of the
outstanding stock would be owned by a practitioner who performs those
services," and that the small professional corporation might easily meet
the other personal holding company tests of nature of gross income and
ownership.6" All undistributed personal holding company income68 is
taxed at 75 per cent of the first $2,000 plus 85 per cent thereof in excess
of $2,000.9 At these prices, professionals had best remain in the indi-
vidual or partnership frying pan, unless they are members of a large
firm or clinic.
Section 543 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 includes among
65. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1371-77, added by § 64 of the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958.
66. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 543(a)(5).
67. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 542(a) provides in part that a personal holding com-
pany means any corporation (with exceptions) with 80% or more of its gross income
constituting personal holding company income as defined in § 543 and with 50% or more
of its outstanding stock owned by not more than 5 persons. Ownership is defined by
§ 544 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
68. This is defined in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 545.
69. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 541.
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the various kinds of personal holding company income "Personal service
contracts" which include:
(A) Amounts received under a contract under which the corporation is to
furnish personal services; if some person other than the corporation has the right
to designate (by name or by description) the individual who is to perform the serv-
ices, or if the individual who is to perform the services is designated (by name or
by description) in the contract; and (B) amounts received from the sale or other
disposition of such a contract.70
This language was unchanged by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.71
The original Committee Report says the language means to encompass
"someone, such as an actor or artist with more or less unique talents,
[who] incorporates himself and draws a salary from the corporation.
The corporation contracts out his services with a third party and the
difference between the amount paid to the individual as salary and the
amount received from the third party is accumulated by the corpora-
tion. '72 The statute was originally adopted to penalize an entity which
had been devised during the 1930's for the benefit of actors, cartoonists
and the like.73 In General Management Corp.,74 the corporation was
paid under a contract for rehabilitation of another company and this
income was held to fall within this provision where the contract required
the taxpayer's chief stockholder to act as comptroller of the other com-
pany. The clutch has also extended to a father-son incorporated insur-
ance agency where the insurance company had not relinquished its right
to name the father as the only one who could accept insurance risks
under the agency contract in the name of the insurer.75
To a one-man professional corporation, the personal holding company
tax, if imposed, would be a disaster.71 Since there is only one practi-
tioner, how could he safely contend that the corporation and not the
patient or client has the sole right to designate by name or description
the person who is to perform the services under any particular contract
of professional employment? Possibly, if the one-man professional
corporation also employs one or more licensed practitioners who are not
shareholders and whose earnings aggregate more than 20 per cent of
70. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 543(a)(5).
71. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 502.
72. Report of the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, H.R. Misc. Doc.
No. 10126, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1937). See note 81 infra.
73. 1 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxes 1718 (1958).
74. 46 B.T.A. 738 (1942), aff'd, 135 F.2d 882 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757
(1943).
75. Rev. Rul. 54-34, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 175.
76. Treas. Reg. § 39.502-1. The power to disregard the corporate entity has been
granted the taxing authorities most frequently in one-man corporations by the courts.
See I RIA, Fed. Tax Coordinator, § D-1200 at 18,037 (1958).
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the gross annual corporation income, the gross income test might prevent
the surtax. If it is the corporation which is employed, and the practi-
tioner is not designated by name, or may only be designated by the
corporation, or if the non-shareholding employee or the one owning less
than 25 per cent of the stock is designated by the client or patient, then
the test is met.7 7 The proposed Treasury Regulations cast faint light
on the problem by stating that a four-man engineering corporation under
a contract to perform personal engineering services would not suffer the
penalty tax if it is the corporation and not one of its shareholders who
is designated to perform the services in the contract.78 The example
apparently means that the four engineers each own 25 per cent of the
outstanding stock. If the corporation assigns the work among the engi-
neers, it is not personal holding company income.
In Kintner,79 the personal holding company problem was not raised.
Of the eight doctors, seven were senior members; the other was a junior
member; none of them apparently had more than a 25 per cent interest.
As an association, it was not exempt from personal holding company
tax8 ° since it met the tests for taxation as a corporation. The cases and
services give us little more. Therefore, it seems advisable to add the
requirement that the small professional corporation itself, like an incor-
porated general contractor, be licensed under state law, as well as its
principal employees. Thus, our professional corporation can itself make
its contract with the patient or client and in turn designate who is to
perform the services, if it would avoid this pitfall or unless it is other-
wise exempt. If these rules are adhered to, our professional corporation
may be secure from personal holding company tax, since it would be
indistinguishable from closely related personal service corporations which
have hitherto escaped this disaster."' In any event, it will be no more
vulnerable to this attack than a Kintner association.
77. 1 RIA, Fed. Tax Coordinator, § E-2309, at 20,052 (1958).
78. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.543-1(b)(8)(iii) Example 3, 21 Fed. Reg. 8925 (1956).
79. See notes 59, 63, supra.
80. G.C.M. 19619, 1938-1 Cum. Bull. 225; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(3).
81. During the debates of the 75th Congress on the question of extending the provisions
taxing personal holding company income to include "incorporated talents", Mr. Doughton,
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, made the following statement:
"This device is used by persons whose services are of such nature as to command large
annual salaries, and is used particularly by screen stars, radio, and concert performers,
artists and the like. Such a person organizes a corporation, the stock of which is held
by himself or members of his family. The corporation then hires the individual at a
yearly salary much less than that which can be secured for his services to a third party.
The amount paid to such person by his corporation is sufficient for living expenses, and the
difference between this sum and that secured from the third party is allowed to ac-
cumulate in the company free from the individual surtax which would have been
paid had the income gone directly to its real owner." 81 Cong. Rec. 9019 [1937]. The
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For the individual practitioner or small firm, the chief hope of relief
from personal holding company tax at present exists in the failure of
Congress to include income from personal services in the kind of personal
holding company income which disqualifies a corporation from the right
to elect to be taxed as a partnership or sole proprietorship under the pro-
visions of section 1371 and following added by section 64 of the Techni-
cal Amendments Act of 1958 (the 'Small Business Bill') which became
effective on September 2, 1958. Although the Treasury Regulations, when
published, or later 'loophole' plugging, may dim or extinguish this hope, it
now appears that a professional corporation could qualify in the great
majority of cases as a 'small business corporation' (i.e., a domestic
corporation with less than 11 individual or estate shareholders, none
of whom is a nonresident alien and all of whom agree to the election,
and which is not a member of an affiliated group of corporations tied
to a common parent) under the new Internal Revenue Code provisions.
After so electing, such a small business corporation's net income would be
taxed to the shareholders as though it had been distributed to them as a
dividend at the end of the corporation's taxable year. The small business
corporation, so electing, will not be taxed on such net income and, at the
same time, it may employ its shareholder-employees and deduct their
salaries and the costs of contributions to qualified profit-sharing, pension
and retirement plans, insurance (group life, accident and health, major
medical) premiums, tax exempt sick pay, employee medical expenses,
Report of Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and .Means of the 75th
Congress, 1st Session, revised, contains, on page 66, covering the hearing of August
9, 1937, the following statement by Arthur H. Kent, Assistant General Counsel of the
Treasury Department, dealing with the limited scope of the proposed amendment in
covering only amounts received from contracts under which personal services are rendered
by a shareholder owning 25% or more of the value of outstanding stock: "If the proposal
were not further restricted, there might be some hardship upon operating corporations
engaged primarily in rendering personal services and which necessarily enter contracts
to render such services, selecting such members of their staffs as they may desire to per-
form such services. Therefore, it is recommended that the proposed amendment be ap-
plicable only in cases where a third party has the right to designate who shall perform
the services contracted for. In most cases such third party will naturally be the other
party to the contract with the corporation for the services of the individual." A similar
statement appears in the Report of the Committee on Ways and Means on the Revenue
Bill of 1937, H.R. Rep. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Session 5 (1937): "The provision that
some third party must have the right to designate who shall perform the services
contracted for, or that the person to perform the services must be designated in the
contract, will prevent this rule from applying in general to operating corporations en-
gaged primarily in rendering personal services and which necessarily enter contracts to
render such services, selecting such member of their staff as they may desire to render
such services. Thus, corporations which let out the services of architects, engineers and
advertisers would not as a general rule be required to report such income as personal
holding company income. It is believed that the proposed amendment will take care
of the 'incorporated talent' loophole."
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deferred compensation and like benefits to the same extent as a 'real'
corporation, without danger from the personal holding company tax."2
A second tax pitfall which the professional corporation must sidestep
is the "accumulated earnings tax" of 2732 per cent upon the first
$100,000 of "accumulated taxable income," and 38Y per cent of the
excess, 3 if the professional corporation successfully avoids the personal
holding company tax. The two penalty taxes are mutually exclusive. 4
Moreover, earnings of $100,000, after taxes, may be accumulated 5 be-
fore there is any danger of this penalty. Thereafter a credit is allowed
for all earnings and profits of any subsequent taxable year retained for
the reasonable needs of the corporation. Such "reasonable needs" of a
professional corporation might include amortization or prepayment of a
mortgage on the business premises; " payment of premiums on life
insurance owned by the corporation on the lives of its "key men"; 8 7
and for anticipated needs,8 such as the retirement of shares or loans
upon death or retirement of a shareholder.8 9 In brief, the professional
corporation must have particular protection, both in its statutory nature,
form and requirements and in its operation, from penalty taxation of
this sortf 0
82. In its special release of August 22, 1958, entitled "Partnership or Corporation under
the 1958 Tax Law," Tax Research Institute comments, at page 28, as follows: "The
pseudo-corporation is particularly attractive for an individual who is an independent
contractor. These individuals were unable to use a corporate setup to get the fringe
benefits because the corporation might then be treated as a personal holding company
subject to a heavy tax. But as a pseudo-corporation this danger is removed but the
benefits remain."
83. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 531. An additional problem may arise under the doctrine
of Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957) if more than one
professional corporation is formed for the benefit of a practitioner or group of practitioners
resulting in the danger of loss of surtax exemption.
84. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532(b) (1).
85. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 535(c) (1), as amended.
86. Lion Clothing Co., 8 T.C. 1181 (1947).
87. Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951).
88. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 537; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954).
89. Note that we have suggested in item 7 of our outline of characteristics of a pro-
fessional corporation (p. 361 supra) that it must redeem all of the shares of a retiring or
deceased shareholder; see Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Ark.
1952). The regulations provide [Treas. Reg. § 39.102-3(a)]: "Undistributed income is
properly accumulated . . . if in accordance with contract obligations placed to the credit
of a sinking fund for the purpose of retiring bonds issued by the corporation." In Pelton
Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153, aff'd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958), an accumulation to
redeem stock of an 80' shareholder was for the benefit of the shareholder rather than
the corporation, could have been made even after a dividend payment, and involved
no danger of sale to outsiders, therefore was held unreasonable.
90. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 533(b): "The fact that any corporation is a mere
holding or investment company shall be prima fade evidence of the purpose to avoid
the income tax with respect to shareholders."
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If initial impressions of the small business corporation are confirmed by
regulations and experience, it would seem that, once the $100,000 level of
accumulated earnings is reached, the professional corporation, with the
consent of all of its shareholders, could then make a timely section 1372
election, and escape all danger of the tax on unreasonably accumulated
earnings.
Finally, there is danger in a one-man professional corporation that,
if the corporation is created solely for the purpose, of reducing income
tax, the Treasury Department may successfully disregard the entity,
and tax him as an individual. 1
Other tax problems of doing business in the corporate form which
beset the close corporation in all fields of enterprise may be equally
anticipated by the professional corporation. Juggling of transactions
between the corporation and the stockholders may result in payments
being treated as nondeductible dividends taxable to shareholders, capital
transactions distorted, and the like.92 "Reasonableness" of compensation
may be a persistent problem. The shadow of re-enactment of an excess
profits tax hangs over all corporations, should a war or "incident" recur.
Liquidations, redemptions and distributions equated to dividends are
factors with which the professional corporation must cope. But, in all
of these respects, professionals would be on familiar ground, sharing
the lot of their commercial brethren, with an opportunity to share their
corporate tax advantages.
CONCLUSION
The professional corporation may prove to be no bumblebee. The
laws of physics cannot fairly be related to the laws of men and their
institutions, except that both types of laws benefit men chiefly when
studied and properly applied. Neither aid invention while blindly
accepted.
Some years ago a not dissimilar inequity existed whereby fortunate
residents of "community property" states had many federal income,
estate and gift tax blessings arising from split ownership of earnings
and property between spouses based upon state law. Some common-law
states, impatient with the failure of Congress to eliminate this discrim-
ination, attempted to change their property laws for the sole purpose
of achieving the same preferential tax treatment. Their efforts were not
lasting monuments, by and large, of state legislation. Their results were
91. Commissioner v. Smith, 136 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1943). But see National Investors
Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944). The general principle is that a "mere
figmentary agent . . .should be disregarded in the assessment of taxes." Moline Properties
Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
92. 1 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 11.04, Transac-
tions between Stockholder and Corp. at 1124-35 (1958).
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splendid, however, from the standpoint of the citizens of all the common-
law states; Congress granted the income splitting privileges of filing joint
tax returns and the estate tax privileges embodied in the marital deduc-
tion. Substantial tax equality has been achieved and these transplanted
community property laws of the venturesome states have quickly died
in almost all instances.
The professional corporation, whether it elects to be taxed as 'real'
or as a partnership or proprietorship, seems to offer professional persons,
who derive substantially all of their income from personal services, vary-
ing degrees of tax shelter. Members of a large firm, with little or no risk
of suffering personal holding company tax, might decide to organize and
continue to operate and pay taxes as a 'real' corporation for so long as a
tax on unreasonable accumulation of income is not a threat, and, perhaps,
later make a section 1372 election. Single practitioners and smaller firms,
after establishing fringe benefit plans to the extent available and appro-
priate, would probably cause their professional corporations so to elect
from the outset and, perhaps, continue to hope for the passage of some
form of Jenkins-Keogh bill. Even if the small business corporation tax
privileges are taken away by Congress through subsequent legislation or
by the Treasury through regulation, the professional corporation could
provide substantial tax shelter for some. The Kintner device might draw
new strength from the support of state law authorizing professionals to
incorporate. If all of the ethical requirements of the professions can be
met under properly drawn state professional corporation statutes or
codes, the way could be swiftly made through sympathetic state legis-
latures for the creation of professional corporations. For a great many
professionals in private practice, such professional corporations, as regu-
lated by their professional governing bodies and state administrative
agencies and as formed by them to set up their own retirement, insurance
and business plans, may lighten the penalties which the graduated fed-
eral income tax has so long imposed upon the professional sole practi-
tioner, partner and associate. At best, such a professional corporation
could provide substantial federal tax equality among businessmen, pro-
fessional men and other taxpaying citizens by direct and prompt action
of the legislatures of the several states.
Lawyers, where they can, attempt to select the most favorable forum
for their cause. Professional men, generally, might well seek to do like-
wise. Let them first consider the professional corporation, and, having
filled it out with appropriate powers and attributes, disciplined it with
proper limitations, and reduced it to legislation compatible with the
corporation laws and constitutions of the several states, then let them
support its creation by the state legislatures. Let them not overlook
in the process their standards of ethics, duties to the public, or dangers
from lay competition.
